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Counterfactual definiteness must be used as at least one of the pos-
tulates or axioms that are necessary to derive Bell-type inequalities.
It is considered by many to be a postulate that is not only commen-
surate with classical physics (as for example Einstein’s special relativ-
ity), but also separates and distinguishes classical physics from quan-
tum mechanics. It is the purpose of this paper to show that Bell’s
choice of mathematical functions and independent variables implic-
itly includes counterfactual definiteness and reduces the generality
of the physics of Bell-type theories so significantly that no meaning-
ful comparison of these theories with actual Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
experiments can be made.
Bell Inequality | Foundations of Quantum Mechanics | Foundations of probability
Bell’s theorem [1] has an unusual standing amongmathematical-physical theorems. No other theorem has
ever been discussed with respect to so many “loopholes”, phys-
ical situations that make it possible to escape the mathemat-
ical strictures of the theorem. It is shown that the reason for
this fact is that Bell’s theorem is based on the postulate of
counterfactual definiteness. The postulate of counterfactual
definiteness to derive Bell-type inequalities is clearly asserted
in the books of Peres [2] and Leggett [3].
Some of Einstein’s reasoning regarding Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) experiments contains also counterfactual realism
and Einstein’s special relativity is counterfactually definite in
the mathematical sense presented below. This fact may have
contributed to the opinion that counterfactual realism is the
major defining trait of “classical” theories. It will be shown,
however, that great care must be exercised with respect to
the choice of independent variables in the argument of the
functions that are used to formulate a counterfactually def-
inite physical theory. It will also be shown that the partic-
ular choice of variables, that are used for the derivation of
Bell’s inequality and Bell’s theorem, imposes significant re-
strictions to the physical situations that can be described by
Bell’s functions and excludes dynamic processes of classical
physics, no matter whether deterministic or stochastic. To
show this fact, we first repeat the main features of Bell’s func-
tions that describe Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm (EPRB)
experiments and then connect them to a precise definition of
counterfactual definiteness.
EPRB experiments and Bell’s functions representing
them
EPRB experiments are performed at two space-like separated
locations. The two particles of an entangled pair emanating
from a source are spatially separated and propagate to the
space-like separated locations. The properties of these par-
ticles are measured by instruments that are described by a
“setting” such as the direction of a polarizer or magnet which
is characterized by a unit vector of three dimensional space
denoted by j = a,b, c, . . .. Measurements of this type have
been performed by a number of researchers and have had a
checkered history with respect to the results. These, at first,
contradicted and then confirmed quantum theory [4]. There
are still significant deviations from quantum theory in current
experiments, which are, however, mostly ignored [5]. We pro-
ceed here by just stipulating that indeed these experiments
showed a violation of the, by now, famous Bell inequality and
describe in the following only Bell’s postulates and assump-
tions, thereby focusing on the simplest case involving only
three settings and not four, as used in actual experiments,
see also [6]. Bell’s postulates and assumptions are considered
by many researchers to be entirely general and valid for all
EPR like experiments and Gedanken-experiments as long as
they can be described by classical physics such as Einstein’s
relativity.
Bell’s classical-physics model for the system of measurement
equipment and entangled pairs of the EPRB experiments is
constructed as follows [1]. He assumed that all experimental
results, all data, can be described by using functions A that
map the independent measurement results onto ±1 or the seg-
ment [−1,+1] of the real axis. The variables in the argument
of the function always include the settings j = a,b, c, ... and
another variable, or set of variables, that Bell denoted by λ.
Bell then proceeded to present a proof of his now celebrated
inequality:
〈A(a, λ)A(b, λ)+A(a, λ)A(c, λ)−A(b, λ)A(c, λ)〉 ≤ +1, [1]
where 〈·〉 indicates the average over many measurements. The
left and right factor of each term correspond to the data taken
at the two corresponding space like separated measurement
stations. The events of measurements and corresponding data
are linked to clock times of two synchronized laboratory clocks.
Therefore, the functions A as well as the variables j and λ
must for each of the products correspond to pairs of clock
times tn, t
′
n where n is the measurement number.
Note that Bell’s original paper assigned to λ only properties
of the entangled pair. It is now generally assumed [7] that λ
may stand for a set of arbitrary physical variables including
space and time coordinates or even Einstein’s space-time st.
Therefore, λ may also describe some properties of the mea-
surement equipment (in addition to the magnet or polarizer
orientation j), such as dynamical effects arising from many-
body interactions of the entangled pair with the constituent
particles and fields of the measurement equipment. Bell agreed
with this assumption in his later work [1].
It is the purpose of this paper to show that the postulate
of counterfactual definiteness in conjunction with the use of
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a setting variable j does not permit the introduction of gen-
eral space and time related variables that describe the said
many body dynamics. Therefore, Bell’s assumptions are not
general enough to describe classical theories of EPRB experi-
ments that include dynamic processes involving the measure-
ment equipment.
Counterfactual reasoning and EPRB experiments
Peres [2] gave the following definition of counterfactual real-
ism, which roughly agrees with the definition of Leggett [3].
Peres claims, as does Leggett, not to use traditional concepts
of mathematics and physics to start with, but only “what
could have possibly been the results of unperformed experi-
ments” and bases his definition of counterfactual realism on
the following statement:
It is possible to imagine hypothetical results for
any unperformed test, and to do calculations
where these unknown results are treated as if they
were numbers.
We agree that it is possible, as a purely intellectual activ-
ity, to imagine hypothetical results for any unperformed tests.
However, without significant additional assumptions, it is not
possible “to do calculations where these unknown results are
treated as if they were numbers”. Here we encounter the so
often unrecognized gulf between sense impressions, even just
imagined ones, and conceptual frame-works such as the ax-
iomatic system of numbers or the probability theory of Kol-
mogorov. Peres, Leggett and a majority of quantum informa-
tion theorists did not and do not recognize that giant gulf,
that giant separation, between events of nature, recorded as
data, and the axiomatic edifices of human thought.
If one wishes to treat hypothetical “results” of unperformed
tests as if they were numbers, one must be sure that these
abstractions at least follow the axioms of numbers. There are
several steps necessary to connect the “events” of the physical
world to numbers. Boole derived ultimate alternatives and
a Boolean algebra while Kolmogorov’s axiomatic system in-
troduces an event algebra and probability space. It is true
that mathematicians often describe experimental situations
or ideas about them by the Kolmogorov framework and just
postulate that a probability space and σ-algebra exists. It is
known, however, from the work of Boole [8] and Vorob’ev [9]
that a given particular set of variables may not be able to
describe certain correlations in any given set of data.
In more elementary terms, we have to consider the following
facts. If we perform “calculations where these unknown results
are treated as if they were numbers”, then we must use the
mathematical concept of functions or something equivalent in
order to link the imagined but possible tests with numbers. A
one to one correspondence of the possible tests and the num-
bers needs to be established and it needs to be shown that
no logical-mathematical contradictions arise from such pro-
cedure. If no such correspondence exists, then the “purely
intellectual activity” is nothing more than child’s play and
the mathematical abstractions of such activity can certainly
not be treated as if they were numbers with some relation to
physics.
Take any set of data derived from measurements on spin-
1/2 particles with Stern-Gerlach magnets, that lists the mea-
sured spins as “up” or “down” together with magnet settings
j = a,b, c, . . .. Can we replace “up” with +1 and “down”
with −1 and expect that the so obtained set follows the ax-
ioms of integers? The “trespass” to deal with tests as if they
were numbers has been committed by several textbook au-
thors, in particular by Peres [2] and Leggett [3]. This point
appears in clear relief, if we write down the data according
to the way in which they are imagined to be taken in test-
ing e.g. the Bell-type inequality. The data are recorded in
pairs corresponding to detector-events that are registered to-
gether with equipment settings and the clock times of syn-
chronized laboratory clocks. Thus we obtain data lists of the
kind: (Dt1j1 , D
t′
1
j′
1
), (Dt2j2 , D
t′
2
j′
2
), . . . , (DtMjN , D
t′
M
j′
M
), the jn, j
′
n repre-
senting the randomly chosen setting pair and tn, t
′
n denoting
the times of measurement. The number of times that the set-
ting (a,b), (a, c), and (b, c) was chosen is denoted by Na,b,
Na,c, and Nb,c, respectively. The total number of pairs is then
M = Na,b +Na,c +Nb,c. One cannot do justice to the num-
ber of different data-pairs by using models with three pairs
of mathematical symbols such as Aa, Ab, Aa, Ac , and Ab, Ac
as they are used in Bell-type proofs. One runs into problems
even if one regards these mathematical symbols as “variables”
(such as Boolean variables [10]) and not just as numbers; the
reason being that one cannot cover all the different possible
correlations of the data by such few variables. If we admit the
two values +1 and −1 for the variables at different times of
the same experiment, then we obtain Na,b+1 different values
for the sum of the pair product
∑M
n=1
δjn,aδj′n,bD
tn
a D
t′
n
b . If we
have three such sums with all independent variables, the num-
ber of possibilities is (Na,b+1)(Na,c+1)(Nb,c+1) ≈ (M/3+1)
3
for M sufficiently large. In contrast, we have for the Bell type
variables Aa, Ab, Aa, Ac, and Ab, Ac only about (M/3 + 1)
2
independent choices of all possible different correlations of
possible outcomes of these variables. This fact arises from
Bell’s description of 3M different pairs of measurements (6M
measurements) by only 3 different variables and represents
another typical trespass that is explicitly made in both the
book of Peres [2] and Leggett [3]: they use a model with a
severe restriction of choices before any physics is introduced
and thus“overburden” their variables in a way which cannot
do justice to the complexity of the data. In real EPRB ex-
periments, one uses four not three different randomly cho-
sen settings [11, 12] but the above argument equally holds for
this case, with (M/3 + 1)3 and (M/3 + 1)2 being replaced
by (M/4 + 1)4 and (M/4 + 1)3 for 4M different pairs (8M
measurements), respectively.
This more subtle problem, a well known problem in the area
of computer simulations, reveals once more the enormous gulf
between data and mathematical abstractions that describe the
data. In the framework of Boole [10], we need to be sure
that the data can be described by ultimate alternatives (the
Boolean variables) and in the framework of Kolmogorov we
must be sure to deal with random variables (functions on a
Kolmogorov probability space). But how can we be sure?
As a minimum requirement we need to introduce functions,
with sufficiently many physical variables in their arguments,
to enable the description of all the possible correlations and
to guarantee a one to one correspondence of mathematical ab-
stractions and the massive amount of data.
To describe EPRB experiments in the general way that Bell
intended and purported to actually have done, we need to
introduce functions A with variables additional to j in their
argument (or indexes, see below). We need to have variables
such as tn, sn, stn, . . . that are taken out of the realm of Ein-
steinian physics and do indeed guarantee the one to one corre-
spondence to the data. For example, we may need to include
tn, the time of measurement at one location and sn represent-
ing any property of the objects emanating from the source.
It may also be necessary to include a more general four di-
mensional space-time vector stn instead or in addition to the
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measurement time tn and we include it here just for complete-
ness. This way we obtain functions A = A(jn, tn, sn, stn, . . .).
Some may ask whether that is not precisely what Bell used
by introducing his λ that, as he claimed [1], can stand for any
set of variables and, therefore, also for the set (tn, sn, stn, . . .).
We thus may have A = A(jn, tn, sn, stn, . . .) = A(jn, λn). In-
deed it is true that this is what Bell claimed. However, as we
will see below his claim is incorrect, because he and followers
have postulated complete independence of λ and j and thus
postulated counterfactual definiteness in conjunction with the
setting variable j according to the precise definition given in
the next section. Einstein locality does not require indepen-
dence of λ of the local setting (see corresponding section).
Note that quantum mechanics does not use any setting-type
of variable as independent variable in the argument of the
wave-function. There, the setting-type variables label the op-
erators. A helpful discussion of explicit and implicit assump-
tions of Bell, with emphasis of the mathematical structure and
consistency, was given by Khrennikov [13].
Mathematical definition of counterfactual definiteness
and Bell’s inequality
Counterfactual definiteness requires the following. We must
be able to describe a measurement or test by using a given set
of variables in the argument of the function A, and thus for
example a setting j = b. Then, we must also be able to reason
that we could have used instead of setting b the setting c and
would have obtained the outcome corresponding to the value
of A, now calculated with setting c and all other variables in its
argument unchanged. Although this type of reasoning is not
permitted in the courts of law, its mathematical restatement
looks natural and general enough:
A counterfactually definite theory is described by
a function (or functions) that map(s) tests onto
numbers.The variables of the function(s) argu-
ment(s) must be chosen in a one to one correspon-
dence to physical entities that describe the test(s)
and must be independent variables in the sense
that they can be arbitrarily chosen from their re-
spective domains.
This definition means that the outcomes of measurements
must be described by functions of a set of independent vari-
ables. The definition applies, of course, to the major theo-
ries of classical physics, including Einstein’s special relativity.
Counterfactual definiteness appears, therefore, as a reasonable
and even necessary requirement of classical theories. However,
most importantly, counterfactual definiteness restricts the use
of variables to those that can be independently picked from
their respective domains. However, a magnet- or polarizer-
orientation, mathematically represented by the variable j, can-
not be picked independently of the measurement times, which
are mathematically represented by tn and registered by the
clocks of the measurement stations. Once a setting is picked
at a certain space-time coordinate, no other setting can be
linked to that coordinate, because of the relativistic limita-
tions for the movement of massive bodies and the fact that
Bell’s theory is confined to the realm of Einsteinian physics
and, therefore, excludes quantum superpositions. Thus any
measurement is related to spatio-temporal equipment changes
and the mathematical variables that describe the measurement
need to represent the possible physical situations.
Enter probability theory and we certainly cannot use the
setting j as a random variable and the measurement time t
as another independent random variable on the same proba-
bility space. The reason for this fact is rooted in the above
explanation and can be further crystallized as follows. It is
possible to define the setting j as a random variable on one
probability space meaning that we may regard j as a function
which assigns to each elementary event ω of a sample space Ω
a so called realization of j e.g. j(ω1) = b. It is also possible,
at least under very general circumstances, to formulate the
measurement times as another random variable t(ω′), where
ω′ is an elementary event of a second sample space Ω′. Again,
given some specific ω′1 we obtain a realization e.g. t(ω
′
1) = t1.
However, the formation of a product probability space on
which both random variables j and t are defined presents now
a problem. That space would necessarily contain impossible
events (such as different settings for the same measurement
times) with a non-zero product probability measure assigned
to them. These facts can actually be formulated as a theorem
stating that setting and time variables of EPRB experiments
cannot be defined on one probability space [14].
Thus, the postulate of counterfactual definiteness in con-
junction with the use of a setting variable restricts the in-
dependent variables additional to j in the argument of Bell’s
functions A to a, physically speaking, narrow subset of vari-
ables that we denote by NB . This subset permits the physical
description of static properties but cannot handle dynamic
properties expressed by space-time dependencies.
As a consequence, the choices that can be made for vari-
ables in addition to the setting variable j in Bell’s theory are
extremely limited, particularly if these variables are related to
space-time (or space and time). This limitation is so severe
that it is impossible to describe general dynamic processes of
classical physics with Bell’s independent variables. The way
to describe general dynamic processes in Kolmogorov’s frame-
work is by using stochastic processes.
To describe a dynamics of EPRB experiments one needs
to use two dimensional vector stochastic processes, which
involves several subtleties that, if neglected, lead to in-
correct conclusions. A general vector stochastic pro-
cess is in essence a vector of random variables, such
as (A1(tn), (A2(tn), A3(tn), ...), whose statistical properties
change in time (we use here discrete time only). A precise
mathematical definition can be found in Ref. [15], pp 11–15.
In relation to EPRB experiments we thus consider vectors such
as (A1(tn), A2(tn)).
A first difficulty that is usually encountered is related to
the physics of spin measurements. According to Bohr, the
outcomes of measurements on each separate side of the EPRB
experiment are spin-up or spin down with equal likelihood,
which appears to suggest stationarity or time-independence
of the random variables A1(tn) and A2(tn). Bohr’s postu-
late, however, does not necessitate a time-independence of the
statistical correlations between the random variables. This
fact has been explained on the basis of a mathematical model
involving time in Ref. [16](pp 55–60) and demonstrated by
actual EPRB related computer experiments [6].
A second difficulty arises from the fact, explained in detail
above, that the time and setting related variables of EPRB
experiments cannot be treated as independent. This difficulty
can be resolved by use of the following two-dimensional sys-
tem of functions (vector stochastic process) on a probability
space Ω:
(Atnjn (ω),A
t′
n
j′n
(ω)). [2]
Settings and times are now included as indexes that are not in-
dependent. jn = a,b represents the randomly chosen settings
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at one measurement place and j′n = b, c at the second. tn as
well as t′n are the respective measurement times. n = 1, 2, 3...
indicates just the number of the experiment. Only one setting
can occur at one given time in order to avoid physical con-
tradictions and incorrect assignments of probability measures.
(Note that a generalization of the time-indexes to space-time
stn is straightforward.)
Bell’s inequality then transforms to:
Atna (ω)A
t′
n
b (ω) + A
tk
a (ω)A
t′
k
c (ω)− A
tm
b (ω)A
t′
m
c (ω) ≤ 3, [3]
where the labels n, k,m are the appropriate, all different, ex-
periment numbers for which the particular settings have been
chosen. Eq (3) puts no restrictions on the correlations of
EPRB experiments, because the actual experiments may now
be represented by a countable infinite number of different func-
tions instead of the three or four functions used by Bell.
There do exist theorems that appear to prove the validity of
Bell’s inequality for stochastic processes (the Martingales dis-
cussed in [17] are just special forms of stochastic processes).
These theorems, however, do not use two-dimensional vector
stochastic processes as used in Eq (2). They use, instead,
counterfactual definiteness in conjunction with setting vari-
ables to arrive at three-, four- or higher dimensional stochastic
processes (Martingales). Thus these theorems cannot encom-
pass dynamic measurement processes [18] and time- (space-
time-) related variables, because they would then imply the
existence of events with more than one setting at a given mea-
surement time and, therefore, involve impossible events with
non-zero probability measure. Such theorems apply, therefore,
only to the set of variables NB as defined above and do not ap-
ply to EPRB types of experiments that may involve dynamical
processes in the measurement equipment.
It is, therefore, imperative to view EPRB experiments in a
different light. A violation of Bell-type inequalities need not
be seen as crossing the border between the reasoning of clas-
sical Einstein type of physics and quantum mechanics, but
indicating a possible dynamics in the interactions of parti-
cles and measurement equipment. This possible dynamics is
what needs to be investigated, particularly as contrasted to
the characterization of the measurement equipment by a com-
pletely static symbol [19].
Einstein locality and Bell’s reasoning revisited
Experimentalists have up to now not used Bell’s theorem
and its implications to search for a many body dynamics
of local equipment, but instead to “uncover” the instanta-
neous dynamic influence of remote measurements, the so called
quantum non-localities. Some consider these non-localities to
be the most profound development of modern physics [16].
They maintain that the measurement of the entangled part-
ner causes instantaneous influences over arbitrary distances.
This search for influences due to distant events is based on
the conviction, dating back to Bell’s original paper, that Ein-
stein locality is necessary to derive his inequality. However,
this is not the case. Bell’s assumption that λ is independent
of the setting variable j is already contained in the postulate
of counterfactual definiteness and Einstein locality is not only
redundant because of this fact, but does not require at all that
λ be independent of all settings. Variables dependent on the
local setting and describing local many body interactions with
the incoming particles are entirely permitted and necessary. It
is counterfactual definiteness that requires that all additional
variables such as λ are independent of the setting variable.
But why does our classical theory need to involve the setting
variable in the way Bell has included it? One can use the set-
ting variable as an index together with another index related
to or representing space-time. These indexes are, of course not
independent as was pointed out above for stochastic processes.
From these facts we can deduce that Einstein locality is not
a necessary condition for Bell’s derivation, rather the opposite.
Its correct implementation prevents the derivation of Bell to
go forward, as shown in Eq (3).
Conclusions
The major premise for the derivation of Bell’s inequality is
counterfactual definiteness, which in connection with Bell’s
use of setting variables restricts the domain of the variables
in the argument of Bell’s functions A to a subset NB of gen-
eral physical independent variables. NB does not include the
variables necessary to describe a general dynamics describ-
ing many body interactions in the measurement equipment.
Using only the independent variables defined by NB , it is im-
possible to find a violation of Bell’s inequality, which therefore
represents a demarcation between possible and impossible ex-
perience [8], not between classical and quantum physics. For a
wider parameter space that permits the description of dynamic
processes and includes space-time coordinates, the validity of
Bell-type inequalities cannot be and have not been derived.
This situation is reminiscent of that with the last theorem of
Fermat before 1984. There existed only rather trivial proofs
of Fermat’s theorem for subsets of conditions (e.g. n = 3, 5),
while a general proof was not known until Andrew Wiles sup-
plied it in 1984. Such more complicated and general proofs
of Bell’s theorem have not been presented and, in the authors
opinion, are not likely to be presented in the future, because
they would need to remove the use of the setting variable j.
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